The compression ignition of fuel-oxidant mixtures

Imperial Users onl

Locational competition and agglomeration: the role of government spending

With the completion of EMU, tax competition and, more in general, locational competition is high on the EU policy agenda. In contrast to the standard neo-classical reasoning, recent advances in the theory of trade and location have shown that tax competition does not necessarily lead to a ‘race to the bottom’. In these recent discussions the relevance of government spending as an instrument for locational competition is unduly neglected. We therefore introduce a more elaborate government sector in a geographical economics model by analyzing government spending and government production. By changing the relative size, direction or efficiency of the production of public goods, our simulation results show that governments can change the equilibrium between agglomerating and spreading forces. In addition, we show analytically that the introduction of public goods fosters agglomeration. Ultimately, our paper shows that by restricting attention to taxes, one ignores that government spending also determines the attractiveness of a country as a location for the mobile factors of production.

Cross-Border Mergers & Acquisitions: The Facts as a Guide for International Economics

Using a detailed and large data set on cross-border merger and acquisitions we discuss the relationship between theory and observed empirical characteristics:(i) most FDI is in the form of M&As, (ii) firms engaged in M&As seem to be ‘market-seeking’, (iii) M&As come in waves (the most recent wave is still unfolding), (iv) economic integration (international deregulation) stimulated M&As, (v) the size of and inequality between M&As grows over time.Our contention in this chapter is that these stylized facts drive and should drive recent theoretical contributions in the field of international economics that try to understand cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Although some models (notably Neary, 2003) explain a number of the characteristics, a full-fledged model of cross-border M&As that, at least in principle, can deal with all the characteristics is still lacking.

A Proposed Hierarchical Taxonomy for Assessing the Primary Effects of Cyber Events: A Sector Analysis 2014-2016

Publicity surrounding the threat of cyber-attacks continues to grow, yet immature classification methods for these events prevent technical staff, organizational leaders, and policy makers from engaging in meaningful and nuanced conversations about the risk to their organizations or critical infrastructure. This paper provides a taxonomy of cyber events that is used to analyze over 2,431 publicized cyber events from 2014-2016 by industrial sector. Industrial sectors vary in the scale of events they are subjected to, the distribution between exploitive and disruptive event types, and the method by which data is stolen or organizational operations are disrupted. The number, distribution, and mix of cyber event types highlight significant differences by sector, demonstrating that strategies may vary based on deeper understandings of the threat environment faced across industries

A Framework for Categorizing Disruptive Cyber Activity and Assessing its Impact

While significant media attention has been given to the volume and range of cyber attacks, the inability to measure and categorize disruptive events has complicated efforts of policy makers to push comprehensive responses that address the range of cyber activity. While organizations and public officials have spent significant time and resources attempting to grapple with the complex nature of these threats, a systematic and comprehensive approach to categorize and measure disruptive attacks remains elusive. This paper addresses this issue by differentiating between exploitive and disruptive cyber events, proposes a formal method to categorize five types of disruptive events, and measures their impact along three dimensions of analysis. Scope, magnitude, and duration of disruptive cyber events are analyzed to locate each event on a Cyber Disruption Index (CDI) so organizations and policymakers can estimate the aggregated effect of a malicious act aimed at impacting their operations. Using the five different event classes and the CDI estimation method makes it easier for organizations and policy makers to disaggregate a complex topic, contextualize and process individual threats to their network, target where increased investment can reduce the risk of specific disruptive cyber events, and distinguish between events that represent a private-sector problem from those that merit a more serious public-sector concern

Agglomeration and Aid

A key issue in development economics is the explanation of core-periphery patterns around the world. Combining this issue with that of analyzing unilateral transfers (e.g. foreign aid) points in the direction of the use of New Economic Geography (NEG) models which, so far, has not been done explicitly. This paper tries to fill this gap in the literature by studying the (possibly ‘catastrophic’) effects of aid around the so-called break-points and sustain-points in a NEG model. We also analyze the effects of a “bystander”, that is a country which is not directly involved in the transfer. In the traditional transfer literature a bystander is known to potentially cause transfer paradoxes. Our findings in this NEG setting are as follows. First, direct transfer paradoxes are not possible in a symmetric setting even if a bystander is present. Second, the effects of foreign aid depend on the level of economic integration between donor and recipient. Third, if the equilibrium from which aid is given is stable, aid only has atemporary effect (even if there is a bystander present). Fourth, if the donor is relatively large, not only the recipient but also the bystander benefits from foreign aid.

Locational Competition and Agglomeration: The Role of Government Spending

With the completion of EMU, tax competition and, more in general, locational competition is high on the EU policy agenda. In contrast to the standard neo-classical reasoning, recent advances in the theory of trade and location have shown that tax competition does not necessarily lead to a ‘race to the bottom’. In these recent discussions the relevance of government spending as an instrument for locational competition is unduly neglected. We therefore introduce a more elaborate government sector in a geographical economics model by analyzing government spending and government production. By changing the relative size, direction or efficiency of the production of public goods, our simulation results show that governments can change the equilibrium between agglomerating and spreading forces. In addition, we show analytically that the introduction of public goods fosters agglomeration. Ultimately, our paper shows that by restricting attention to taxes, one ignores that government spending also determines the attractiveness of a country as a location for the mobile factors of production.

Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions: On Revealed Comparative Advantage and Merger Waves

By combining two large data sets (on international trade flows and on mergers and acquisitions – M&As), we are able to test two implications of Neary’s (2003, 2004a) recent theoretical work. Analyzing M&As in a General Oligopolistic Equilibrium (GOLE) model incorporating strategic interaction between firms in a general equilibrium setting, we argue that: (i) M&As follow revealed comparative advantage as measured by the Balassa index, and (ii) M&As come in waves. We find convincing support for both hypotheses, thus showing for the first time that there is an empirical connection between export performance and mergers and acquisitions.comparative advantage, cross border mergers and acquisitions, merger waves, general oligopolistic equilibrium model

Locational competition and agglomeration: the role of government spending

With the completion of EMU, tax competition and, more in general, locational competition is high on the EU policy agenda. In contrast to the standard neo-classical reasoning, recent advances in the theory of trade and location have shown that tax competition does not necessarily lead to a ‘race to the bottom’. In these recent discussions the relevance of government spending as an instrument for locational competition is unduly neglected. We therefore introduce a more elaborate government sector in a geographical economics model by analyzing government spending and government production. By changing the relative size, direction or efficiency of the production of public goods, our simulation results show that governments can change the equilibrium between agglomerating and spreading forces. In addition, we show analytically that the introduction of public goods fosters agglomeration. Ultimately, our paper shows that by restricting attention to taxes, one ignores that government spending also determines the attractiveness of a country as a location for the mobile factors of production.

Economic Geography within and between European Nations: The Role of Market Potential and Density across Space and Time

In explaining the uneven spatial distribution of economic activity, urban economics and new economic geography (NEG) dominate recent research in economics. A main difference between these two approaches is that NEG stresses the role of spatial linkages whereas urban economics does not do so. We estimate simple versions of these two views on economic geography and also establish if the relevance of spatial linkages varies across aggregation levels or time. For our sample of 14 European countries and 213 corresponding regions, we find that spatial linkages are more important at the country level and that its relevance varies across time.